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RouNDTABLE DISCUSSION OF ANHS 2002 PRE-
coNFERENCE ON THE MAOIST REBELLION IN NEPAL 
Welcome back to our evening discussion. This 
evening we will begin with reaction statements from 
two of our members, Mary Des Chene and Stephen 
Mikesell, and then we will open our discussion to all 
of you. Mary Des Chene will you begin? 
Mary Des Chene: I want to do three things this 
evening. First, some audience members asked me 
to discuss a several issues that were neglected dur-
ing the paper sessions. Second, I want to respond to 
some things I heard in the afternoon sessions. Lastly, 
I want to suggest some issues that we all need to be 
thinking about. 
One issue mentioned to me after the formal dis-
cussion in the afternoon is the land issue. We have 
managed to talk for a whole day without considering 
land ownership, which is a fundamental issue for 
very many supporters of the Maoists. We should all 
be struck with this. It shows that we've had a very 
urban and middle class perspective. That issue made 
me think more generally that the Maoist Three Point 
Plan has not come into this discussion at all yet. 
And I just want to point out here that most of the 
things that are on that list are either enshrined in the 
constitution or are in already existing laws: the state 
should be doing most of these things now, by its 
own laws. So ignoring those very specific demands 
as the ravings of radicals, is really inadequate. And, 
proclaiming that these demands are cynical ploys to 
capture state power also seems disingenuous, a way 
to discredit the claim. It is something that can only 
get tested through a negotiation process. 
Mark Liechty, who had to leave, said he was sur-
prised that the term "nation" never really emerged 
in the discussion this afternoon. I am not going to 
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repeat all he said here, but his comment reminded 
me that there are other important grassroots move-
ments going on in the countryside: the ethnic move-
ments, the language-based movements, and so on. 
So, Mark's comment about "nation" identifies one of 
the sources of the Maoist rebellion that we have not 
explored adequately. 
From today's session, we had a very vivid portrait 
from Judith Pettigrew of the army on a rampage in 
a village. And in another case, Kanak Dixit brought 
out cases of Maoists executing people that would not 
appear to be class enemies. I think that it's prob-
ably not useful to argue over who was engaging in 
worse human rights violations. There is a fair bit of 
documentary evidence to be looked at. But rather 
let's look at the people judith talked about, those 
who are not political activists, but are "caught in the 
middle." This is something that is really widespread, 
especially outside of the Maoist "base areas ." Some of 
the points that Richard Bownas was making about 
differences between organizing in places with em-
bedded organizers who have long been part of the 
society and in places where there is the recent ex-
pansion of struggle. But I think that when we talk 
about being "caught in the middle," we must note 
that in the vast majority of documented cases, the 
Maoists are seeking food and shelter, while the army 
actions in the village are in the form of beatings and 
killings. These are not equivalent things, and I think 
that needs to be emphasized when we think about 
what people are caught in the middle of. There have 
been many cases like those judith described that 
have been documented by Amnesty International 
and other human rights organizations. In addition, 
there are many other cases that aren't well enough 
documented to get into the human rights reports. That raises 
the question whether the sLate actions in the current crisis 
represent deviations from iLs main tendency or reveal its 
main Lendency. This return s us to the question of what those 
holding po·wer now mean by democracy, or mean by human 
rights, or mean by people. Those are hard questions that any-
body who wants to talk about the nature of the war needs to 
be thinking about. 
I want to comment on t\.vo statements that Kanak Dixit 
made this afternoon. Is Kanak here? (Voice yells "Not yet, but 
he will come soon ") 
Well, but I don't have time to wait because Arjun tells me 
my time is up ... In his talk today Kanak said he vvasn't going 
to talk about army killings. I want to say no to the idea that 
thi s is a subject that should be tabled. Anybody who believes 
in the right of state government to exist in Nepal has the duty 
to document to the best of their ability the conditions under 
which the killings are occurring. I especially include in this 
group social scientists who have made their careers in Ne-
pal. 
Kanak also said "most problems are linked to the intel-
ligentsia within the Kathmandu valley." I think he meant that 
the failures of the intelligentsia are the main problem. I find 
this a very narrow reading of Nepal's reality. What is missing 
is the entrenched landlords in the countryside, the intense 
culture of oppression, the struggles of peasants, and many 
many other issues. The question is who will determine Ne-
pal 's future: the elites or the masses. I personally can't imag-
ine how Kathmandu intellectuals are capable of resolving 
most of these problems, though they could contribute more 
to them. Rather it will require very deep knowledge of local 
and regional issues and of local ways of battling through. 
One last thing we must think about: the role of interna-
tional agenls. What about the $20 million in military aiel and 
Lhe 5,500 machine guns the US recently provided? What is 
the very real but complex role this aid plays in expanding and 
deepening the war in Nepal. We need think seriously about 
this issue. I'll stop now. 
Arjun Guneratne: Thank you Mary. Now let's hear from 
our second commentator, Stephen Mikesell. 
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
Stephen Mikesell : I want to take off on thi s last point that 
Mary was making. It is striking that all these discussions and 
papers were made without including the international con-
text, and yet we're seeing very similar things happening all 
over the world . If you read, for example , Monthly Review, 
you see analyses of a lot of similar things, and even worse 
things, happening in Central America lately. Indeed , condi-
tions in Central America are much more advariced than Nepal 
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and may suggest what's going to happen in Nepal over the 
next few yea rs. It's curious that with everyone talking about 
globalization, we don't look at Nepal from a global perspec-
tive . We're now in a world that's dominated by international 
finance, which has been setting the agenda in Nepal over the 
last ten years, with the privatizations and the other "solutions" 
they've been promoting. So, reformers acting with the of best 
intentions, trying to implement democracy will be up against 
the very real problems international finance will impose. For 
example, in the last ten years since democracy came, I know 
that something like twenty international banks have opened 
branches in Nepal. As Lenin pointed out a century ago in 
his book Imperialism, the Last Stage of Capitalism, banks are 
the vehicles by which financial capital establishes rule over 
a country. In Nepal you can see it concentrating many small 
pools of capital , which once were available in the country-
side, but have now been taken out and are no longer available. 
Even if they were used for usury, they were still locally avail-
able and that's the way agriculture has been maintained over 
the centuries. But, now they're being concentrated outside of 
the villages and are being absorbed by large capital in order 
to advance their agendas in the country. Take automobiles, 
for example. I heard there are now 200,000 automobiles that 
have been imported into Kathmandu, for 90 km of roads! 
If you multiply that number times $20,000 per automobile, 
I think you have $4 billion just in automobiles, including, 
among other things-and adding the petroleum imports re-
quired by automobiles-the growing trade imbalance. 
Another issue is cultural change. Hundreds of thousands 
of people are becoming Christians each year, especially 
among the lower classes. This is the same constituency that 
the Maoists are aiming at. Many of these revivalist Protestant 
Christian projects are out of Korea. This kind of Christian-
ity is promoting an American agenda, or a multinational and 
capitalist agenda, among other things. And, if we are talking 
of losing culture, as pointed out in the book Fishers for Men, 
Founders of Empire: The Wycliff Bible Translaters in Latin 
America , Christianity is in some ways more insidious than 
the Maoists. And, of course, there is TV and consumer cul-
ture that Kanak mentioned. Regarding this issue of cultural 
homogenization: the question is: Culture for whom? 
Another aspect of culture change comes from Nepalese so-
journing in India and beyond. Some 7,000 women or so are 
being trafficked to India for prostitution every year, and there 
may be 100,000 or so in Bombay. Poverty forces millions of 
men and women to go abroad for work, but few of us have 
considered the impact of these experiences on the culture of 
these people. 
Then there is the question of development. In colonial 
times they called it "civilizing." But after the WWll the whole 
ideology of development was created in order to counter the 
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rise of the nationalist movements. l think a lot of people were 
making that point today. Dollars and Sense magazine recent-
ly noted that for every dollar of development aid more than 
three hundred dollars are returned to the finance capitals of 
the world. You can actually see this process in Nepal: after 
how many years of development the country is burdened by 
this immense international debt , among other things. 
Another issue l had is education, especially in the coun-
tryside. Rather than really addressing the needs of Nepal's 
rural residents, education is actually making young people 
want to leave the countryside. When you look at Nepal 's 
education program, it looks like something that comes out 
of the West, but the image is distorted , as if you are seeing 
it in a broken mirror. If you go into the classrooms, there's 
tremendous overcrowding, like the hundred kids per class-
room l saw in Bandipur; and l just wondered how much 
they could get out of that, sitting there every day. And at 
the same time they were losing whatever acculturation or 
socialization they had previously had within the village. So, 
in the countryside at least, I see education as a way to dis-
qualify young people, because they aren't really prepared to 
be successful in the School Leaving Certificate exam, which 
is the core of the education system, nor are they prepared 
to live and work in the countryside. ls it any surprise that 
young people are angry and see taking up weapons as the 
only solution? Even urban kids, who "succeed" in the edu-
cation system with high marks and the coveted degrees in 
engineering and medicine, are trying in large numbers to 
leave the country to join transnational corporate culture 
that they have been educated and socialized in because they 
no longer have the qualifications or tools or imagination to 
find a place for themselves in their own country any lon-
ger-particularly working in and among and for the vast 
majority of the country, the rural population-despite their 
country's crying needs. 
The last issue I'd like to raise is "democracy." This returns 
me to my first point: we often neglect the international con-
tex t. ln the last ten years we've seen "democracy" come to 
many, many countries. Some critics claim that this is re-
ally a much cheaper way to extend finance capital and run 
the world than relying on absolute regimes with their kings 
. and dictators . Also it's been a very good way of promoting 
things like privatization, which never could have happened 
in Nepal's old Panchayat regime, for example, because that 
regime had no legitimacy. Democracy legitimizes the cur-
rent regimes in Nepal and elsewhere. A democratic political 
system is also a way to co-opt the opposition parties. All this 
co-opting and corruption that has been happening in Nepal 
these last 12 years is also happening in the democratic re-
gimes that have come to Brazil, Argentina, El Salvador and 
other places. Most of these countries have had dictators and 
revolutionary movements. With democracy and coalition 
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governments, the formerly revolu tionary opposition has 
been coopted and NGO'd and all kinds of things. l can't 
help wondeting if there is a liberal solution for these kinds 
of problems7 Anyway, those are the issues that 1 wanted to 
raise. 
Arjun Guneratne: Thank you Steven. l believe that Mary 
Des Chene will read a statement from Padma Ratna Tulad-
har. 
STATEMENT BY PADMA RATNA TULADHAR 
Mary Des Chene: The statement I am about to read is ad-
dressed to our conference from Padma Ratna Tulaclhar. He 
wrote it in English, so this is no translation. He sent this on 6 
October 2002 so that is just two clays after the royal takeover, 
when the king dismissed the government and began ruling 
himself through his appointed Prime Minister: 
Dear friends, as you gather to discuss the difficult tim es Ill)' 
country is passing through, I lwpe it might be useful to you, 
to hear from someone who's been in the midst of efforts for a 
peaceful resolution. As ma11y of you may lmow, I have served as 
a mediator to bring about peace tall?s between tl1 e government 
and the CPN Maoists since the very beginning of the people's 
war. I speal? from the perspective of wlwt that experience has 
taught me. I would lihe to briefly comment on three areas: 1) 
what i.s the nature of CPN-Maoi.sts and what do they want? 
2) what has been the impact of negotiations and what are the 
prospects for peace? 3) what are the positive and negative im-
pacts of international actors? 
First the Maoists. It seems many times in both internatio11al 
and Nepa lese jon1111s tlwt the armed struggle is discussed 
without reference to the Maoist ideology or political agenda. 
Since the international "war 011 terrorism" began , they have 
also been labeled terrorists, altlwugl1 up until that tim e th ey'd 
been consistently recognizee! as a political force with a politi-
cal agenda. Whether anyone agrees or disagrees with tl1 eir 
agenda, an understanding of it needs to form one basis of any 
discussion. I will point out a Jew hey elements of their stated 
agenda. 
A) The movement i.s purely a political moveme11t based on 
the ideology of Marxism and Maoism . 
B) The movement aims to achieve purely political motives, 
that is, the liberation of the Nepalese people from all forms of 
exploitation . 
C) The movement seehs to establish in Nepal a people's de-
mocracy or a hind of people's mle. 
D) They do not believe that they could achieve all this i11 two 
years , and with ease, so tl1 ey termed this war a lo11g- term or 
protracted people's war. 
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E) They believed that the present parliamentary democracy 
is a capitalist democracy which cannot solve the problems of 
the people of the country, so they want to end this present polit-
ical system and establish a new democracy. This they declared 
when they started the People's War. 
F) They believe that the Nepalese people are a sovereign peo-
pk and that they are entitled to be the masters of their moth-
erland. And that this could happen only through the armed 
revolution. That is, the use of force is essential for the libera-
tion and the empowerment of the people. 
G) At the same time, they are also in Javor of dialogue or 
peace negotiations to bring about the above objectives. That 
is, people's war can end in dialogue and implementation of lib-
erating policies that end exploitation of the masses. They've 
always responded positively to dialogue tall~s. I've never lmown 
them to reject any discussion to bring about tall?s. · 
H) At present, there's a Three Point Program: 1) the forma-
tion of an interim all-party national government; 2) the forma-
tion of a constituent assembly to be elected by the people; 3) 
the institutional development of the republican state. This is 
the political agenda they presented during the second round of 
talks in September last year; they still stand by this agenda. 
My second topic is peace negotiations. 
A) First, the Maoists say that if anything could be achieved 
through a peaceful means, they are quite prepared to be en-
gaged very seriously in peace negotiations. 
B) They have repeatedly said that they could be flexible in 
peace negotiations and have sometimes used the phrase "maxi-
mumly flexible ." A concrete example of that flexibility is that 
during last year's peace negotiations they put aside their de-
mand for a repLtblican state and were ready to negotiate first 
on the other issues alone. 
C) Recently the Maoists proposed for a roundtable political 
conference to convene and find a progressive way out of this 
serious national problem. 
D) Viable proposals have come from other political parties 
and the human rights sector as well. For example, the move-
ment to save democratic rights, of which I am a part, proposed 
and offered to organize a roundtable conference to be attended 
by all the major political parties, including the Maoists and the 
government. It was only the government who did not indicate 
willingness to participate. 
E) I can inform you that the Maoists are still prepared to 
respond positively once the government makes public policy 
dialogue. They are also prepared even for a unilateral cease-
fire on the condition that the governinent would reciprocate 
immediately. The government had not made any call for dia-
logue, instead rejecting all overtures from both the Maoists and 
united calls from the Parliamentary party. Nor has it made any 
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commitment to reciprocate in a ceasefire. 
F) No one can say what may happen in the near future, or 
whether a leg itimate government, serioLts about negotiating, 
will be formed. But it is my view that the new governmer1t 
should have a one point program to start peace negotiations, 
negotiate with sincerity and seriousness, and thus create an 
environment to hold elections as soon as possible. This shOL!ld 
be the prime mandate to the new go vernment. 
My third area of discussion is the role of international ac-
tors . BecaLtse peace negotiations are quite possible, if there is 
the political will for them, and because the Maoists have made 
public commitments to peaceful solutions, and also because 
they have indicated their willingness to halt the war, in my 
view there is no necessity to escalate the war from either side. 
The vast majority of the Nepalese population are always in 
favor of peace tall?s. This fact or this sentiment of the people 
should not be neglected by any of us. But the government 
stance has hardened against peaceful solutions ever since it 
began receiving signals, increasingly followed up by material 
assistance, of international support for defensive and offensive 
military action. In this climate, more than one Nepalese official 
has called for "finishing off the Maoists ." Military aid is noth-
ing other than SLtpport for a long, bloody, civil war and for the 
killing of our youth, whatever anyone may call it. We continue 
to talk about talhs and remain quite hopeful of the possibility. 
There are hindrances, too, some domestic, some international, 
and these are exacerbated by the international climate of fear 
and the easy labeling of political insurgents as terrorists. 
I wish to point out two key areas where the international 
sclwlars and activists might intervene on the side of increasing 
the possibility of peace in Nepal. First, the government should 
not purchase or import arms to escalate war. At the same 
time, I am requestingforeign governments not to supply arms 
to our peace-loving country. Indeed, if they were to looh into 
the human rights record of the armed forces, which has been 
documented by respected international bodies lil?e the U.N., 
Amnesty International, or a recent report of the European 
Union, many would find themselves bound by domestic law or 
treaty obligations to terminate their aid. Rather, they shou ld 
help us solve our serious national problems through peace-
jLil means. We want to benefit from international experience 
solving these problems through peace dialogues . We wanted to 
have moral and political support from the friendly countries to 
achieve peace, justice, and progress for the people of the cowr -
try. But while there are many friends who offer this SL!ppo rt, 
there are other countries who are increasingly supplying guns, 
ammunition, night vision equipment and strategic plans for 
attacking. This military aid is really impacting tl1e COLtrse of 
events and derailing prospects for peace. 
The second area where international scholars can help is by 
pressuring their governments and other international agencies. 
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The Maoists are still being labeled and treated as terrorists. 
The Nepalese government has banned them and considers the 
Maoists treasonous. Their leaders have a price placed 011 their 
heads and are on Interpol's lists. Although the United States 
has not yet placed them on their list of terrorist organi zations, 
that, too, might come. Finally, 110 government is questioning 
the Nepalese government's claim that the Maoists are terror-
ists or tlu pachage of illegal laws tlley have enacted, w~e tl1e 
Anti-Terrorist Act which has created SLtch a climate of terror in 
both city and countryside and has jailed journalists, lawyers, 
and simple peasants, depriving them of the most basic legal 
rights. All this pushes Nepal further away from the possibility 
of peace. I ash you to do what you can in your own place to 
promote useful and positive international responses to Nepal's 
problems and to our efforts for peaceful revolution. Thanl~ you 
for this opportunity to speal~ to you from afar. (Padma Ratna 
Tuladhar) 
Arjun Guneratne: Thank you Mary. I think the floor is 
now open for anyone who wishes to comment or to ask ques-
tions. 
THE ISSUE OF DEMOCRACY 
john Metz: I had a question for Kanak. You were suggest-
ing that democracy is the solution to Nepal's impasse, and I'm 
wondering what kind of democracy you're thinking about' 
Especially given vvhat Steve Mikesell was saying about de-
mocracy. I mean that without addressing the inequities in 
access to land and other resources , without dealing with the 
all-pervasive corruption, it seems unlikely that peace can be 
restored. One type of democracy that strikes me as a model 
is found in the Indian state of Kerala. Here they have restruc-
tured opportunity to meet the needs of the poor majority. 
Kanak Dixit: That is the kind of restructuring that we are 
suggesting. lt is not the restructuring of the Maoists lt goes 
beyond the Maoists. lt will not be easy. This is a long-term 
process, not a panacea. We have to get over the immediate 
roadblock of the Maoist versus the government-the Maoists 
versus the army-and get back to negotiating a settlement. 
The medium to long-term way ahead is to make sure that 
our democracy increases, and this will not be through this 
constitution alone. This constitution has to be deepened . One 
way to do it is through evolution, through the social move-
ments, the NGOs, and so on. The whole idea is there's a lack 
of ownership of the government in Nepal right now, over the 
last twelve years since the 1990 uprising. The Maoist move-
ment came out of left field, yet it forced us to look at the prob-
lems, which in my view are actually much larger than what 
the Maoists perceive. l think there is a lot of romanticism 
in how the Maoists are being perceived. And if we look to 
the source of this lack of ownership, it is having to do with 
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ethnicity, it is having to do with class, of course, it's having to 
do with region . By region l mean, "l can take the Tarai, you 
can take the Far 'vVest." By ethnicity l mean the vast major-
ity of Nepalis , who are divided into many, many miniscule 
ethnic groups who do not have representation. So, what is 
the way out? ls it through regional government' Certainly, 
Kerala's democracy is an absolute minimum that we need to 
have and we are actually working towards it. The Village De-
velopment Committees (VDCs) of the post 1990 period were 
actually working towards that idea. Beyond that, should it be 
regional parliaments leading to a national parliament? Would 
that mean using the Development Zones that King Mahendra 
created in the 1960s, a division which hitherto has had no 
function at all? So, rather than having the VDCs and district 
assemblies leading directly into the center, we should insert 
a regional parliament because most of our ethnicities are di-
vided in regions, and so would a regional parliament provide 
the kind of representation and decision-making for ethnic 
groups that the current parliament is not able to dol l used 
to believe that talking about democracy is about romantic pie 
in the sky. Now, l think we must make the democracy work, 
and we must try and see why it doesn't work and what to do , 
rather than go through a gun-slinging revolution. 
Mahendra Lawoti: I'd like to continue on the concept of 
democracy. ln fact, democracy in Nepal is the topic of my 
dissertation, so l can go on for a while. (Audience laughs) 
As regards to the problem in Nepal, I see two problems. One 
problem is the running of the current democracy; the second 
is how to create a more effective democratic system. One of 
the major problems of our current system is the lack of hori-
zontal accountability. Because the executive is very power-
ful and because he appoints the constitutional commission 
which is supposed to be supervising his activities, the system 
has failed to work. A second major problem of the current 
democracy is the failure of the electoral system to provide 
vertical accountability, as evidenced by the various electoral 
frauds and abusive use of money and so on . If we can have a 
mechanism led by independently appointed central commis-
sions like the Election Commission, the Commission for In-
vestigation of Abuse and Authority, and so on, our democracy 
might be more able to check the executive and other powerful 
agencies. 
But going beyond the current system, how can we accom-
modate Nepal's multicultural society? Looking around the 
world, we see multicultural societies that have different kinds 
of democracies. In Nepal we have the Westminster and ma-
joritarian democracy. However, other multi-cultural societies 
have consensual, or consensus democracies. The difference 
between these two systems is that rnajoritarian democracies 
seem to address the issue of class, whereas consensus democ-
racies address the issue of class as well as cultural diversity. So 
in multicultural societies like Switzerland and Belgium, con-
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sensus democracies have worked pretty well. Let me explain 
some of the difference between these two forms of democ-
racy. In a majoritarian democracy, the party with a plurality 
of votes has most of the power and gets to rule. However, 
in a consensus democracy there are different kinds of power 
sharing elements, for instance, paternalism[7] is one of the 
most common things in the society, so that different groups 
. get autonomy around their own cultural and development is-
sues, education policies, and so on. So my understanding is 
that if Nepal wants to have an inclusive democracy it would 
adopt consensus forms, which would require some kind of 
autonomy within a federal system, some kind of proportional 
electoral system, and the protection of minority rights written 
into the constitution. And even the regional government that 
might form would have to protect the minorities within the 
region because a lot of ethnic groups within Nepal cannot 
protect themselves. 
Unfortunately, in a dialog between the government, the 
political parties, and the Maoists, I don't think many of these 
issues will be discussed. If we look at what happened in 1990 
during the dialog between the Palace and democracy move-
ment leaders, when it came to political power, the "restora-
tion of democracy movement" leaders got most of the power 
from the king, but they accepted that the king would main-
tain complete control over the army. But in terms of making 
cultural issues a key element of the negotiations, the democ-
racy leaders just didn't do it. The reason for this is that the 
democracy leaders, people like [Ganesh Man Singh, Krishna 
Prasad Bhattarai], and so on have the same kinds of interests 
as the king. And I guess on many issues, even the Maoists 
might share these interests. I believe that the political parties 
are slightly more progressive, because they have accepted, at 
least in terms of their declarations, that they would go for 
autonomy, secularity, and so on. But when it comes to the 
real bargaining process, I don't know how hard they will fight 
for ethnic group rights . They might give them away to get 
something else on the table . So, my proposal would be that 
there should be a constitutional assembly composed not only 
of political parties , but also of representatives of other interest 
groups in the society, like cultural interests , societal interests, 
etc. Only by including all voices in drafting the constitution 
can we ensure that a viable democracy will form . 
WAR AND VIOLENCE AS TERRORISM 
Julia Flowerday: I vvouldlike to make a general (:omment 
to all. I know the conference intended to include experts on 
Afghanistan as well as from Kashmir and Nepal, and I think 
we could have benefited from that broader spectrum. Because 
vvhat I sense is that terrorism is not just killing, it is also the 
traumatizing of those who survive. So, what I want to con-
sider is the ways war and oppression by sta:te governments 
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or by ethnic groups can terrorize those they do not kill. For 
example, it would have been informative to have listened to 
scholars familiar with Afghanistan talking about the Taliban 
and the kinds of trauma they caused to women and others 
without actually killing them. Or we could consider the prac-
tices of the Israelis as they interact with Palestinians. The 
Israelis practice a vVestern sort of trauma, where they'll take 
their victims away from the local population to torture them. 
In the developing world, however, terrorist acts often occur in 
open public view. A particularly horrible example occurred 
in Gujarat this last year when Hindu nationalist extremists 
killed thousands of Muslims in retaliation for Muslims kill-
ing about 100 Hindu supremacists on a train. The retaliations 
included women who were pregnant and had their bellies 
slashed open, their fetuses killed, and then the woman herself 
killed. Or Muslims who were rounded up, locked in a house , 
the house flooded with water, and electrical wires thrown 
into the water, electrocuting all the people. Or children who 
had kerosene poured on them and they were set afire in the 
street. The people who witness these atrocities are all trauma-
tized and terrorized. But of course, those committing these 
atrocities are really interested in controlling the people who 
live, not the ones who die, so our focus should also be on the 
living. There's also a way humanitarians play into this game 
of trauma because they reproduce those images and spread 
the word, thereby also creating terror in people who are just 
at the margins of whatever is going on. I don't know if any 
of you saw the film Gladiator, but I thought it was absolutely 
brilliant because it showed how the violence of gladiator 
fights and killing Christians helped those in power control 
the society. It's the kind of trauma and terrorism that I think 
we're all a part of today, but we're involved in it at different 
levels and in different ways. And I just think that if our panel 
discussion had been a bit broader, we might have penetrated 
some of these issues a little bit more. We really have a big 
spectrum to consider when we look at terrorism. 
U.S. INVOLVEMENT 
john Metz: One of the things that strikes me about our 
discussions today is the comp;exity of the issues and their 
geographical specificity. Cabeiri Robinson talked brilliantly 
about the complexities of Kashmir. Sara Shneiderman and 
judy Pettigrew talked about specific places in Nepal and the 
specific events that occurred in those places that have affect-
ed local people. Mahendra Lawoti has discussed the varying 
forms of democracy and how the structure of the political 
system can accommodate or ignore the needs of groups who 
may well wage war when their needs are neglected. But on 
the other hand, what's going on in the U.S. right now is ram-
pant simplification, a fearful retreat into cliches and jingo-
ism, a willful ignoring of the complexity of our world. So, 
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this is what we should really be doing, trying to counter this 
over-simplifying trend, trying to make our students and our 
society realize the complexity of our world, because learn-
ing to accommodate the complexity and the ambiguity will 
determine our survival as a civilized society. The other thing 
is the hegemonic power the US wields. Those of us who are 
US citizens have a responsibility for our government. It has 
the· power to give money and horrific weapons to vvhomever 
it decides will further its interests. Moreover, it can create the 
discourses that justify actions that affect the fates of millions 
of people. The US can label the Maoists terrorists and define 
people in ways that make them deserving of death. So, how 
can we counterbalance these trends and the powers of the 
US7 
Sara Shneiderman: I'd like to follow up on that. I have 
many comments about the numerous strands of our discus-
sion, but I want to speak to US involvement in particular and 
then respond to Padma Ratna Tuladhar's statement that Mary 
Deschene read earlier. But first I'd like to ask while we're all 
here whether we want to take collective action, perhaps make 
a collective statement about the situation in Nepal. I am hop-
ing that Judith Pettigrew will describe how the Britain-Nepal 
Academic Council came to make a public statement regarding 
the war in Nepal. And then l want to ask whether the ANHS 
would like to do something similar. Perhaps that's an issue 
we should take up at the full membership meeting tomorrow 
night, but I'd like to raise the issue now while everybody's 
here. Judith, maybe you could fill us in on what happened 
in the UK? 
Judith Pettigrew: It was in February 2002. lt grew out of a 
conference which was specifically about the war in Nepal that 
we had in London . We wrote to the Prime Minister condemn-
ing the Nepal government's requirement that health practi-
tioners report to the military the medical treatment of people 
who have been injured in the war. 'vVhat we did was discuss 
the issue on an afternoon, draft a collective statement, and 
decide to write to the Prime Minister, which we did. And we 
left it up to individuals to sign the collective statement. And, 
we received a reply very quickly, though it was not a reply that 
we were happy with, but it did show that our concerns had 
registered with the Prime Minister. 
Steven Mikesell: I have another suggestion. There is an 
open public newswire and Internet site that goes to 40-50 
countries called Open Media [www.internews.org]. so .l re-
quest that you publish thing5 about the war in Nepal, espe-
cially about the US advisors and arms, at that site. I'm. also 
trying to put together a global Web page of publications. An-
other thing I've noticed is that many local newspapers, like 
·the Madison papers, are getting information on line, as are 
community radio stations across the US , including Pacifica 
Radio . So, getting reports and opinion pieces to them is one 
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good way to reach a really big audience. 
THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
Li Onesto: I am Li Onesto with the Revolutionary Worker 
newspaper [http://rwor.org/s/nepal.htm] . ln 1999 I had the 
opportunity to travel in the guerilla zones of western Nepal for 
3 months and to interview many of the insurgents, including 
some leaders of the CPN (Maoist). l wanted to speak to some 
of the issues that Mary Deschene raised, and I also wanted to 
discuss the significance of the base areas, their pivotal role in 
the strategic program of the Maoists . Even the government 
has admitted that most districts have these base areas and 
that it has lost control over them. There was a lot of talk today 
about what motivates the Maoist insurgents. Many of you are 
experts on Nepal. You have detailed knowledge about con-
ditions there: the poverty, the inequality, the caste system. 
People are looking for an alternative. Especially after the 1990 
uprising, people expected changes, but there were none. So, 
they looked for an alternative, for leadership, and that search 
became part of a push in the direction of the Maoists. 
At the same time, l think it's very important to understand 
that there is also a pull. What is it is that is actually capturing 
the imagination of the thousands of people who are joining 
the Maoists? What is the relationship between that and the 
base areas where they have established what they call "peo-
ple's power." Because l don't think that they would be having 
the kind of military success that they are without the pull of 
their hope for a new Nepal. This is not just what the Maoists 
are saying, but it is what the international news media report, 
and what the government's own report shows. 
As Mary brought out earlier, we must dig into what is go-
ing on in rural Nepal. ·whether we agree with it or not, you 
have to really dig into the Maoist program. What is it that 
they're offering to people? What vision is capturing millions 
and millions of peoples' imaginations? When l was there, 
I interviewed a lot of people who had witnessed the trans-
formation that is going on in the base areas, especially with 
women and their participation. So, what is the actua l strategy 
of the Maoists, especially in relation to the base areas? The 
strategy is actually to protract the war. ln other words, they 
don't want to come up against the government in a decisive 
battle. Rather their strategy is to have a long drawn out war 
in which they're building up base areas and seizing power bit 
by bit until the point where they can actually seize complete 
state power. This leads to the discussion of state power. In a 
lot of countries guerilla movements have the goal of waging 
armed struggle in order to negotiate a piece of the pie, in or-
der to become part of the present set-up. That's not at all what 
the Maoists seek. This is what really delineates them not only 
from other communist or political movements in Nepal, but 
from other movements all over the world. 
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Another crucial area is the question of a larger global con-
text. This issue that Steve is raising is tremendously impor-
tant. The US role, especially since 9/ll, is ominous. That 
Colin Powell is going to Nepal or that Nepal's Prime Minister 
is invited to the 'White House is unprecedented. How will US 
military aid and military generals visiting Nepal to investi-
gate the civil war affect the government's desire to negotiate a 
peaceful solution? I think one of the questions that we have to 
ask is, what is the role of US citizens in speaking out about the 
human rights issues, about the "state of emergency" and the 
king's recent seizure of power, about the U.S. government's 
military and diplomatic support, given to a government that 
is clearly carrying out massive human rights violations? You 
·need to do what the Committee to Protect journalists in New 
York has done to publicize internationally the repression of 
journalists that's come down, the censorship, and the jailing 
of not just Maoist journalists, but even mainstream journal-
ists. So I don't think there has been enough coming to grips 
with the responsibility that you people here have in terms 
of educating the public beyond these circles. I mean, this is 
great here, you are sharing information with each other, but 
how many people in the broader US population know about 
what's going in Nepal? I mean, isn't it the responsibility of 
people here who know about this stuff to speak out? I think 
that's something that you really need to think about . 
just a couple of other points on the question of a larger 
global context. When I was interviewing villagers in the gue-
rilla zones, they were always very curious about and want-
ing to know about other revolutionary movements around 
the world . They also were very intent on me communicating 
their message that their struggle was part of an international 
struggle, that they saw their struggle as in solidarity with 
other peoples' struggles beyond Nepal. Now this isn't just an 
abstract gesture. If you actually look at the things that the 
Maoists are doing, like their participation in international or-
ganizations, it is clear that their strategy is an international 
one. A concrete example that you may not be aware of is that 
the Nepalese Maoists and 10 or 12 other Maoist organizations 
from the region formed an organization and held their first 
conference last year. (This group is the Coordination Com-
mittee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia.) 
They see this as a strategic alliance, a strategic coordination 
because they know that even if they do attain their goal of 
seizing povver in Nepal, that they can't stop there . They know 
that when they take control of Nepal it will upset. the stabil-
ity of the whole region. Because they're very clear th?t they 
think that India will eventually get more directly involved 
in opposing their struggle. And so, I think the regional stra-
tegic significance of the Maoist struggle is another thing to 
consider. And finally we have to return to how the U.S ., UK, 
and other powers are looking Nepal in terms of the volatility 
of that region, and what a successful Maoist example would 
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mean in that whole region. 
Finally, I wanted to say a few words about an extensive 
interview I had with the top leader of the CPN (Maoist), Pra-
chanda . One of the things that he really stressed was their 
international strategic view. At the very end of the interview 
he told me that although Nepal is a very small country, be-
cause of their circumstances, they can be a spark which has 
a great deal of significance beyond Nepal. So to conclude, I 
think that, some of this international context was missing 
from the discussions today. And its not just a backup, but it 
really is what's driving the situation right now. We see Tony 
Blair holding an international meeting of the major imperial-
ist powers in London to discuss the Maoist problem in Nepal. 
When does that happen? Since when does the President of 
the United States invite the prime minister of Nepal to the 
White House? It seems Nepal has become some part of the 
overall global strategy of the US and its allies. So, what will 
you Nepal scholars do? 
Arjun: May I ask, if you are going to address yourself to 
what Li is talking about? 
Will Van De Berg: Yes, I will. I am Will Van de Berg. I 
was also struck with the absence of an international context 
today. I agree with Li that base areas are a very key element 
in Maoist strategy, that if you achieve comfortable base areas, 
you can enculturate all the populace, and so you can actually 
prolong the conflict for generations if you like. In addition, 
base areas provide safe training areas for the struggle and for 
the ultimate, last stage of attack, which is taking control of the 
urban areas and the entire state. And I also agree with Li that 
base areas have allowed the major escalation of the conflict 
that we are seeing. But, I have been amazed today that I have 
not heard Sendero Luminoso mentioned even once, because 
Peru is the closest parallel to what's going on with the Maoist 
movement in Nepal. Sendero Luminoso was following that 
same strategy, but what really stopped their movement was 
that they relied too heavily on a few charismatic leaders, so 
when the government captured and killed or imprisoned the 
leaders, they cut the head off the rebellion. My advisor, Bob 
Rhodes, was living in Peru during the Sendero civil war, so 
he and I are now writing a paper comparing Peru and Nepal. 
Nepal's Maoists are still held in high esteem by many in the 
western world because Nepal remains relatively safe for tour-
ists and Westerners. What is less well known is that during 
the first ten years of the Sendero struggle, they also did not 
attack western tourists. When finally they did start attack-
ing tourists , the tourist industry declined drastically and that 
hurt the economy and the government. Of course, Nepal's 
tourist industry is already suffering. I have been doing my 
dissertation research on tourism for the past three years, 
and so I watched as the royal massacre and the 9/ll attacks 
crushed tourism in Nepal. I mean after 9/ll agencies had 62% 
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to 100% cancellation rates from Americans and 50% to 70% 
from Europeans, Japanese, and other nationalities. And that's 
without the Maoists attacking tourists. But, we will probably 
see the lvlaoists go after tourists within the next several years , 
if they follow the Sendero model. What do we all have to say 
about this? I mean, most western commentators fail to con-
demn the insurrection because it's been safe for them, even 
though it's not safe for the majority of the population of the 
country. This is a seriously flawed approach. Similarly, we all 
talk about our fieldwork in the areas, but when Maoists begin 
to attack foreigners, vve will lose our access to these areas. 
Mahendra Lawoti: I want to point out some criticism of 
what Padma Ratna Tuladhar said in the statement Mary De-
schene read earlier. Tuladhar's statement is clear indication 
that the Maoists are willing to negotiate with the state, and 
this suggests that they are willing to compromise. But, as Li 
Onesto said, and she knows the issue quite well, the primary 
intention of the Maoists is to capture the state. So, if the Mao-
ists goal is to take over the state, they are not going to come 
to a settlement and will have to fight it out. So, I don't know 
whom to believe. Yet, I do not think that they will be able to 
win. At that time the top leadership might come to a com-
promise, as earlier high caste communist leaders have. I am 
not saying that this is certain, but I wonder if it is not a likely 
scenario. The current Maoist leaders come from upper and 
middle class/caste backgrounds. I wonder how well they un-
derstand the needs and experiences of the villagers who fol-
low them. So, if victory seems to be impossible, they may cut 
a deal with the government and abandon their Maoist ideals. 
THE BASE AREAS 
Li Onesto: I want to respond briefly to Will because while 
the base areas are an important place to train an army and 
carry on a struggle, the most important role of the base areas 
is to actually begin to exercise people's power so that villagers 
can have a vision of what the revolution can bring, the trans-
formation of economic, political, and cultural relations within 
the society. And this is really the "pull" aspect of the revolu-
tion. Take women for instance. 'vVomen, as people here know, 
are very much oppressed in that society. But what are women 
finding in the base areas that is capturing their imagination 
and leading them. to the position where they're willing to give 
their lives. I met 17 and 18 year old girls in the peoples' army 
there, who were killed in action. And they knew the dangers, 
they had friends who had been killed, but they were wiUing 
to go into battle, knowing that they might be killed. So what 
was it that led them to this commitment? In the base areas 
they could actually see the beginnings--'-the beginnings, not 
the full transformation-of a new society. You see it when you 
meet a couple, and they say, they have a "love marriage," not 
an arranged marriage. To people in Nepal, you lotow that's a 
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very heavy thing. Or for people to say this is an inter-caste 
marriage. Or for a 1vlaoist platoon to be traveling all clay and 
then come into a village, and then the men prepare the meal, 
and everybody eats together. I mean these are very radical 
things that are giving people a new vision. They are address-
ing the class and gender issues in a concrete and real way 
right now. It is not like: "Oh, we have this program and after 
we seize power everything's going to be great, and you'll all 
get your new society then." That doesn't really cut it, espe-
cially if you're asking people to give their lives. But if people 
have concrete models in the base areas, they actually see the 
transformation occurring and they're part of the process. 
Someone over here raised the question of the middle class 
leadership. As I interviewed the leaders, they talked about the 
impact the initiation of the war had on the party in terms of 
its composition. vVhat happened was a lot of the intellectuals 
left. Many of them weren't ready to go underground, weren't 
ready for the kind of struggle that took place after '96. So, 
especially in areas where the party was not as strong as it 
was in the west, intellectuals abandoned the struggle, so the 
composition of the party changed to become more of a party 
based on peasantry. You know, I think some of you need to 
approach the Maoists with more understanding, to look at the 
1vlaoist program to see what they're actually doing. I think you 
will see the peasant supporters are not only reacting to the 
highly repressive and impoverished conditions, but they're 
also responding to what the Maoists are offering. 
Sara Shneiderman: I want to say a few words in response 
to motivation and the issue of the base areas . I lived primarily 
in Dolakha district, though I also spent some time in adjacent 
parts of Sindhupalchok between 1998 and 2000. Dolakha, in 
particular, was in the process of becoming a base area, and so 
I had a chance to observe some of these processes up close. 
My understanding is mostly anecdotal since I wasn't trying 
to do research on the civil war at the time: it just happened 
while I was there. I co-authored another paper with Mark 
Turin last fall in which we tried to represent some of the local 
and village perspectives on the formation of the base areas 
(2004. 'The path to Jan Sarkar in Dolakha district: Lmvards 
an ethnography of the Maoist movement' in Himalayan 'Peo-
ple's War': Nepal's Maoist Rebellion'. Michael Hutt eel. Lon-
don: Hurst and Co.). vVe were particularly interested in the 
people's courts and the "jan sarkar," which are the people's 
government that the Maoists were setting up. So, I'll just take 
a few points from that paper, which reflected our perception 
at the time. Now, this was actually very early, in the process 
of establishing Maoist state infrastructure in the area, and 
my sense is that some of the feelings of support may have 
well changed afterwards when government actions raised the 
stakes. A number of people with whom I was familiar helped 
us understand what the people's courts in particular could of-
fer in terms of a local way of mediating disputes, particularly 
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having to do with lane!. People were very frustrated that they 
had to go to Kathmandu to have any problem resolved. There 
was one man that 1 came to know well who had been strug-
gling over a land dispute for twelve yea rs and vvas about to 
go to Kathmandu for his final appeal when the people's court 
was set up. Suddenly he found a quickresolution to his prob-
lem . This illustrates one of Mahendra Lawoti's points about 
centrali zation: people felt that during the democracy era, the 
government had greatly centra lized government processes in 
the city. The feeling was that there had been greater access 
to local dispute resolution mechanisms during the Panchayat 
era, so the Maoists promise was for greater access to loca lized 
dispute mediation. Or at least that's how it was perceived. 
The second point 1 wanted to comment on is that people 
were very interested in the concrete Maoist demonstrations 
of land reform, or the redistribution of wealth. For examples, 
some Indian missionary post was taken over by the Maoists, 
and all of their cups and plates were redistributed through-
out the area. People were really excited about this. They were 
like: "Hey, now I've got a set of five steel plates." 1 think this 
incident led people to see how redistribution might lead to 
greater opportunities. So, those are a few points. 
Cabeiri Robinson: 1 have several themes that keep com-
ing into my mind, but 1 can't quite get them all to march 
together. 1 really wanted to thank everybody who spoke be-
cause 1 feel like 1 learned a tremendous amount here today. 
But what keeps striking me, in contrast to the comments a 
lot of people have made about the uniqueness of the various 
places they discussed, is the tremendous similarities that we 
see in the anti-state and inter-state armed violence around the 
world, especially in the post-Cold War era. 1 think there are 
continuities in Latin America, certainly in the transition from 
Cold War politics to reconciliation processes. This concept 
of democratization keeps coming up. 1 was thinking of Craig 
Calhoun's very poignant critique of the emergence of ethnic 
violence in the former Yugoslavia. Calhoun suggests that part 
of the problem is the post-Cold War era, where you started to 
think about democratization as something that the free mar-
ket itself can produce, in contrast to the idea of civil society 
being the place where democratic processes function and are 
strengthened. 
But then 1 also started thinking about the critiques ofNGOs 
that started in the 1990s, when people started making com-
ments like: "Well, NGOs looked like they were providing a 
lot of important development work, and in fact tl1ey actually 
did, but they also then lifted the responsibility of the state 
to provide certain kinds of goods and services, and to pro-
tect the rights of certain categories of citizens." This has then 
allowed other kinds of oppressive practices to begin and to 
re-inscribe and resuscitate the NGOs·. And then, from there, 
1 started thinking about current work some anthropologists 
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have clone on conflicts in Africa, where they ask us to identify 
the context where military organizations are actuall y provid-
ing services like arbitration, like protection, like secur ity that 
we traditionally think of as being provided by the state. And 
then in all of this 1 just started thinking about the invocation 
of this idea of the state itself, and it seems the term is kind of 
fluid and often quite slippery. 1 mean sometimes it refers to 
territorial areas, sometimes to institutions, sometimes to the 
interaction between electorates, political representatives, and 
institutions. And it started to seem to me that as area specia l-
ists, we have a very important and unique ability to actually 
look at what's happening, to be a social scientist who can of-
fer a cr itique on a lot of theoretical levels and at a variety of 
spatial scales. When we take this kind of broad perspective, 
we can actually see how these powerful relations are being 
produced, because all of the very specific situations that we're 
talking about are actually implicated in much, much broader 
processes at the scale of the global economy. So, it seems like 
the invocation of a broader level can provide an important 
insight into what's actually happening in our areas of special-
ization and around the world. 
VIOLENCE, TERROR AND SOCIAL CONTROL 
Mahendra Lawoti : Well, l'cl love to continue the debate 
on the push and pull factors of the Maoists, but 1 think there 
is a third factor as well, which has not yet been discussed . 
That factor is that in the villages there are certain groups of 
people who do not agree with the Maoists. These people have 
been subdued and terrorized into submission. Not that 1 am 
not calling the Maoists terrorists, but the phenomenon of ter-
rorizing opponents and enemies into subm ission is widely 
documented by the press and others. 
1 also want to talk about the long-term program of the Mao-
ists . 1 think until last year the intellectuals in Kathmandu 
were sympathetic to the Maoist movement. But that has 
slightly changed, since the Maoists began destroying infra-
structure, and 1 think that the Himal media opinion polls 
that were clone in 1999, 2001, and this year support this view. 
ln 2001, the popular opinion survey did not identify Mao-
ist problem as one of the top three problems of Nepa l. But, 
the recent opinion survey, as it was reported in the Nepal 
press, indicated that the majority of the people now think 
that Nepal's democracy is threatened by the Maoists. So, go-
ing to the long-term program of the Maoists: what do they 
really stand for7 Suppose there are people in the villages who 
disagree with the Maoists, as in do they have the right to live 
over there or not? The Maoists say they are talking about the 
People's Democracy. So what is People's Democracy7 ls it that 
people can listen, but can they voice opposing opinions? Or 
is the people's democracy going to be the programs which are 
decided by the leaders of a certain political party7 So 1 think 
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we have to ask the difficult questions while talking about the 
Maoist rebellion. 
Arjun Guneratne: I'd like to draw some parallels between 
the Maoists in Nepal and another Maoist movement in South 
Asia that no one has yet mentioned, the People's Liberation 
Front, or JVP, in Sri Lanka. The JVP started off as a Maoist 
movement in its first incarnation in 1971 when they began 
a civil war, but the rebellion was quickly suppressed by the 
government. And then the second uprising came in 1987, but 
by then this was very much a Sinhalese nationalist movement, 
although it used marxist rhetoric. India had intervened in the 
government's war with the Tamil separatists, so the rebellion 
was very much anti-Indian and anti-Tamil. After about two or 
three years of some very brutal fighting, which left 30,000 to 
60,000 people dead, depending on who's counting, the JVP 
was crushed for the second time. Most of the casualties vvere 
killed either by government death squads or by the JVP, with 
the government death squads killing most. 
There are many, many parallels between the JVP and the 
Maoists, but the one that came to my mind has to do with 
the nature of their violence. Now, when you have to deal with 
your class enemy, or a traitor, or someone who's passing infor-
mation to the police, the expedient way is to kill that person. 
But what happened with the JVP and with the government 
death squads was that they were not content with simply kill-
ing their enemies. Rather, they would mutilate the bodies of 
their victims. So, when government death squads went into a 
village and took people away in the middle of the night, the 
victim's bodies would turn up the next morning on the public 
road. They would have been put on tires and burnt. That was 
a popular way for the government death squads to deal with 
people, even those who were not even necessarily JVP, but 
were suspected of being JVP or had been fingered by their 
enemies in the village as being JVP sympathizers. 
What the JVP did was similar. I'll give you an example. 
At the University of Peradeniya in Sri Lanka , there is a nice 
round fountain in the middle of the campus about as large as 
the front of this room. The JVP on one occasion kidnapped 
a group of its enemies, beheaded all the victims, and neatly 
arranged the heads around the fountain at night for the cam-
pus to see the next morning. Now, I've been struck by the 
similar kinds of brutalities being practiced by the Nepalese 
Maoists, and I suspect by Nepali state forces. Example in-
clude stories of somebody being dismembered, chopped up 
into three parts or of someone 'Nho has all his limbs chopped 
off but is left to survive. And when I think of these horrors, I 
ask mysel f, "What is the purpose of this kind of violence? " I 
mean, if what you want to do is to get riel -of your enemy, just 
!(ill him, and then it's done. I heard somebody give an answer 
to this question at a conference on violence in Sri Lanka that 
I attended several years ago. This terrorism is not directed 
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at the dead person , but at the living. They are doing this to 
discipline the living, to warn any potential opponents to stay 
out of any active opposition to them. 
But, the conclusion I draw from this is that any movement 
that needs to use these kinds of atrocities probably doesn't 
enjoy widespread support. If you are a mass movement , the 
overwhelming support of the people is with you, and you 
don't need to use terrorizing violence to reach your goals. I 
mean there might be people in the village who pass informa-
tion on to the police, but they can be dealt with in the usual 
way by execution. But mutilating their bodies is not necessary 
unless there is a substantial number of people who aren't with 
you and who therefore must be disciplined. At least that is 
what makes sense to me, though I don't have any data to sup-
port that interpretation. 
And returning to the JVP, once the second uprising was 
crushed , the JVP eventually was legalized and has since be-
come the third-largest political force in Sri Lanka's democratic 
politics, after the two top political parties, the United Na-
tional Party and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. Moreover, the 
JVP has completely eclipsed the old, traditional Marxist and 
Communist left. But what's interesting about the JVP is their 
support base is roughly between 7 and 10 percent of the total 
vote. Their support tends to be concentrated in certain parts 
of the country and not in other parts. So the JVP, for example, 
is very, very weak in the cities; it tends to have a stronger base 
in certain rural areas. Now, let's assume that 20 percent of the 
Sri Lankan population supported the JVP, which is probably 
excessive, but just for the sake of the argument we'll assume 
20 percent. Well , that's very far from being a majority; that's 
very far from being mass support . So these numbers provide 
an insight into this whole discussion. What I think this sug-
gests is the simple fact that an organization which is militarily 
strong does not necessarily enjoy mass support. lf I can make 
just one more parallel , it's with the LTTE, the Liberation Ti-
gers of Tamil Elam. Now, the LTTE and its supporters claim 
that they speak for the Tamils and enjoy mass support from 
the Tamil population. Of course, if we look at the history of 
the LTTE, you find out that they speak for the Tamils because 
they murdered all of the Tamil leadership and eliminated all 
of the other guerrilla groups. So, it's got to the point that Tam-
ils who do not agree with the LTTE keep their mouth shut 
because they know the consequences of publicly disagreeing 
with the LTTE. Therefore, the LTTE is the sole voice of the 
Tamil people, there are no other voices. So, my contribution is 
that we have to look at the total situation, at the history to see 
what these groups have done. Is there anyone else? 
ON METHODOLOGIES 
judy Pettigrew: Yeah, I've got a comment. It strikes me that 
a lot of us here are anthropologists and a lot of us work or have 
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worked in rural communities in Nepal. And we haven't talked 
very much about methodology today at all. And l wanted to 
raise the point because it strikes me that this is a time when 
we need to be very creative about methodology. Vve need to be 
adapting methodologies. There are concerns for informants. 
There are also concerns for ourselves. Are there new and dif-
ferent ways we should be working? Or is it the same ways 
we've always worked, but perhaps with creative modifications 
adapted to the violent situations we are observing? 
julie Flowerday: A political geographer whose name is es-
caping me suggested several years ago that the newest ways to 
check theory is through methodology. And so I think we need 
to cut across every boundary we can and to start using every 
methodology and, in effect, combining quantitative, qualita-
tive ways of looking at things. And giving credibility to and 
empowering the people of the very areas vve work in. 
Lauren Leve: I just wanted to follow up on the methodol-
ogy themes. It's not methodology that worries me . It's confi-
dentiality. It's the safety of people that we work with, people 
that we care about so much. And I can't stress the need for 
confidentiality enough. We can come back home, and it's rel-
atively safe back home anywhere you live. I know that espe-
cially during the Vietnam 'vVar era, anthropologists had their 
work and their files used in ways that they never anticipated. 
These are issues of professional and personal integrity that we 
all need to think about. 
Li Onesto: I'm not an anthropologist, but I can say some-
thing about methodology. First, in terms of methodology, I do 
think it's important that we take seriously the information we 
are given and what our informants believe and present as fact. 
And I don't pretend to know all that's going on in the areas I 
am visiting. And even if you're there, you're only in one area 
and you don't know what's going on throughout the country. 
But especially since the state of emergency, it's been increas-
ingly difficult to really know what's going on around Nepal 
because of the suppression of information. I mean, basically, 
under the state of emergency, the government just came right 
out and said: People are going to report to us the information 
we say they must. The main issue for the government is to 
get the people to tell them what is going on. And when they 
didn't, the army interrogated and put in jail a lot of them. And 
some of them are still in jail. 
Another aspect of information is government propaganda. 
There's definitely this information campaign to present the 
battle with the people's army positively, in a way that implies 
that the army will triumph. I mean, because you hear a lot of 
stories about how these areas of war and conflict are now sup-
porting the government, and how so many Maoists were killed 
by government troops. So on the one hand you have that, but 
then on the other hand, the Maoists will release information. 
They've released three or four information bulletins in the last 
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couple of months in which they counter a lot of what the gov-
ernment is putting out. I'm not saying that you have to believe 
one .or the other, but I'm saying you have to really investigate 
and try to weigh the different versions of what is going on 
before popping off on the government or mainstream media 
claims. I remember the very first People's Army person that I 
met when I first arrived in Nepal was killed in battle a week 
after l met him. The first report that I heard about the battle 
was in the Kathmandu Post, and it reported that there had 
been this encounter and that the guerrillas had fought and 
refused to surrender. But, when I talked to the Maoists, they 
told a whole different story about what had happened. Then 
there are the stories that get told and retold until become al-
most legendary, even if they are not true. One is about the 
actual military encounters and the revolutionary violence of 
the Maoists . First of all, any revolution has incidents that are 
mistakes where a local commander departs from the actual 
policy of the leading force. So there's that. But there is also 
the question of how the Maoists are waging their military war 
against the government? From what I understand they are 
not going out and indiscriminately killing all the civilians 
in an area, like the government is. So, even when there are 
incidents of unjust killings or targeting people that are really 
innocent or imposing a punishment that doesn't fit the crime, 
those errors are limited to certain targeted individuals. What 
the Maoists are mainly doing, as I understand it, is attacking 
the government, raiding police stations, engaging the army. 
Then on the suggestion that several of you have made that 
people are being coerced and don't support the Maoists but 
go along with them because they're afraid. There is the argu-
ment that just because you are militarily strong doesn't mean 
that you have the support of the people. On the other hand, I 
don't think the Maoists could be waging the successful, con-
tinuously growing and expanding revolutionary movement if 
they didn't have mass support . There is also the question of 
democracy. The Maoists do not claim to stand for everybody. 
They accept theories of class struggle. They don't pretend to 
support property rights of landlords. Their program is to get 
rid of the inequality, to establish a socialist government that's 
based on proletarian power, and this is what their program 
has done in the base areas. There is always going to be a cer-
tain amount of coercion by those in power. Somebody had 
mentioned earlier that in the revolutionary schools they make 
the kids sing revolutionary songs. Well, if we go to schools in 
the US, they make kids say the pledge of allegiance. Is that co-
ercion? Well, you can make an argument either way, that here 
in the US we have a democracy, or not. But, coercion can't be 
the main way that you rule, otherwise you're going to lose 
support. Support has to come from showing the benefits your 
program brings. My last point has to do with Arjun's sugges-
tion that the Maoists don't have support and this is proven 
by the stories of them torturing people. I think that was your 
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implication there. 
Arjun: No, I was saying that the situation is much more 
complex than a simple statement like "they have mass sup-
port" would warrant. 
Li Onesto: Okay. 
Arjun Guneratne: And you have to look-
Li Onesto: All right, all right, all right. 
Arjun Guneratne: -at a complex situation in a complex 
way. 
Li Onesto: Right. I agree with that. But the key element of 
this is that in terms of the actual torture and killing-people-
as-examples in order to terrorize the living. By and large it's 
the government doing the majority of these incidents. 'vVhere 
are the human rights violations really being carried out7 
Arjun Guneratne: Okay, I think in the interests of time, 
we need to wrap up the discussion. So let's have Kanak, Sara, 
and Cabeiri as our last commentators. 
Kanak Dixit: l will make three quick points. One is that 
one shouldn't wish revolution. Number two is that in Nepal 
much more than in other parts of colonized South Asia it's 
very important to speak the language. 'vVithout access to Ne-
pali discourse via the language, much of the information you 
need is out of reach. You're presuming to make decisions in 
your mind regarding the Maoist party without following the 
debates in Nepali language, so you're missing a lot of the most 
important information. And my third point is that the Mao-
ists by and large operate outside the law, and do not consider 
themselves bound by the law. So, I have nothing to say about 
that. What I'd like to say is that the government has to keep 
itself to a higher standard. And I say higher standards because 
the Maoists, in my mind, carry on deception. But we have 
to have some level of confidence in the government, in the 
army. I personally believe that the Maoist control of their base 
areas has less to do with Maoist strength than with the lack 
of government presence. Take Operation Romeo: when the 
government is out there in force, and has an army covering 
the entire landscape, but they remain scattered very thin and 
battling a very vicious and motivated enemy. There remains 
one point that has not been discussed enough today, although 
people have talked about a lot of different subjects. I think 
that it's the most powerful because it tells you that the pain 
lies among the common people. The pain is not in the govern-
ment. The pain is not in the Maoists. The pain is in the pe_ople 
of Nepal, who are who are sometimes under the Maoist gun 
and are occasionally under the army gun. There's enormous 
mass cumulative ecological stress and displacement of the 
·people, which shows itself in many ways, from stress of those 
who stay at home, to the mental anguish of the family as their 
young depart from the home, to the pain of not being able to 
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till one's land. The fact is that you're looking towards famine 
in winter and late spring in large parts of West Nepal. This is 
the massive pain that I think is not being acknowledged and 
which is where we should be beginning to look for answers 
by checking out that pain and discovering where it is coming 
from. A last point: just because the armies are out, our civil 
societies are practically silent in condemning the suppression 
of our rights. Our media is not doing the kind of covering 
that is needed. It just very quickly went undercover by saying, 
"Oh the rules will not allovv us to do a lot of coverage, so we 
cannot." Rather than trying to expand on the coverage, which 
you could still do a lot of despite the restrictions. So the point 
I'm making is that not enough demands have been made by 
Nepali civil society on the Nepali media, the Nepali intelli-
gentsia, or the Nepali government because civil society can at 
least demand responsibility from the government, which the 
government is not now showing. There is no political control, 
no civilian control in Nepal and this is the result of the ter-
rible tragedies we are seeing in Nepal, events which will be 
reported in years to come. I think that is something at the 
very least , because the government is not committed to high 
standards. 
Sara Shneiderman: I just wanted to make a few final points 
to bring together some of the strands that have come out 
about methodology. Being at this meeting has shown me that 
within the Western academic community there is both a great 
deal more discussion and a markedly more mature examina-
tion of these issues than there was, say a year ago. l think 
that's a very good thing, but I'm wondering where do we go 
from here7 I think Cabeiri's point about the need for com-
parative studies is clearly something we need to do . It seems 
that the community of scholars working in Nepal were caught 
off guard by the quick rise of the Maoist movement. People 
didn't know how to address it. It's taken some time to catch 
up with that, and I think that we're just starting to do that 
now. One of the things that we can do is learn from the areas 
of the world where there have been discourses on violence 
and revolution for a much longer time: Latin America , Africa, 
and other parts of South Asia. l think we need to draw those 
kinds of theoretical frameworks into our discussions of the 
Maoist movement. And we're starting to do that . And I think 
that Kanak said something today about social historians un-
covering what's happened sometime in the future. I think he's 
right because part of what's going on now cannot actually 
be documented. But I'm also wondering what can be docu-
mented and what our role is as those who do the document-
ing. What do we feel are the priorities and how do we engage 
with them and how do we make those strategic choices to do 
that kind of work? Or do we? And since this is going to be the 
end of the discussion, I'll leave it as an open question, but I 
would ask that we continue to discuss these issues in one way 
or another. 
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Arjun: Cabeiri, you have the last word. 
Cabieri Robinson: I was just thinking about what it is like 
for you people who already are Nepal experts and suddenly 
have to deal vvith this tremendously violent, dangerous situ-
ation. vVhen I went to do my fieldwork in Kashmir, I had the 
benefit of knowing the situation. [here there is a long, but 
inaudible sentence] And I also have experience with being in 
two kinds of state situations, one being a situation of open-
armed conflict and the other being one of state surveillance. 
[inaudible sentence] And one of the things that I found in the 
literature on conflicts vvas the idea that there were certain 
things that the social scientist could not know, should not 
try to talk about. And I went to the field thinking that I could 
not ask about certain topics because they were too dangerous. 
But, one of the things that I realized during the years that I 
was working in Kashmir was that this rule was actually un-
satisfactory because a lot of the places around which secrecy 
was produced, were actually what was creating spaces for the 
practices of violence and oppression. And so we're met with 
the paradox of, on the one hand, not being able to talk about 
what that secret is without putting people in danger. And on 
the other hand, by not talking about it , we participate in the 
reproduction of these conditions by which the violence is per-
petrating itself. And so it seems to me that one of the problems 
that we've then come to in this is the tension between the idea 
that is it our job to expose and the idea that the act of expos-
ing, when there is no process ensuring that the perpetrators 
'Will be held accountable, actually helps the perpetrators pro-
duce ongoing practices of violence. And it seems to me that 
while obviously we can't talk about the kinds of secrets that 
put anyone in imminent danger, it is irresponsible not to talk 
about the structures of power which produce those secrecies 
and then give [?]. I think there's actually not a huge amount 
of social science and anthropological work on this, but there 
is some . And a lot of it actually goes back, you have to go back 
to a very interesting . . [tape runs out] 
Arjun: Well thanks to all of you for this interesting and lively 
discussion and for your participation throughout the day. 
T he Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies ANHS--regularly schedules such roundtable discussions and panels 
at the Annual Meeting on South Asia, held in mid-October at 
the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Convey your ideas for 
Roundtable and Panel topics to ANHS President Arjun Guneratne, 
and consider attending the meetings. 
ANHS holds its annual members meeting during the conference, and the council, officers, and editors of HIMALAYA 
all appreciate the opportunity to meet other Himalayanists and to 
plan activities for the benefit of ANHS members and others with 
interests in High Asia. 
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